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INTRODUCTION
Saul and Ananias accidentally killed a man in a bar fight. Both
were sent to the same prison. Saul began reading the Bible and joined
a Protestant denomination. He consistently attended worship services.
Ananias too joined the denomination, but unlike Saul, he did not
develop sincere beliefs. He merely enjoyed Saul's company and his
relationships with other religious prisoners. Ananias attended only
one service and didn't own a Bible.
Members of Saul and Ananias's church held an annual month-
long fast, avoiding meat, eggs, and dairy. The prison accommodated
inmates by providing a special diet, as long as inmates made a written
statement affirming their beliefs and agreed to eat only religious food.
Saul and Ananias provided the necessary statement. Saul explained
his beliefs in detail, while Ananias provided a short, generic statement.
During the fast, Saul traded his religious meal for a plate of prime
rib. Saul immediately regretted his transgression and consulted with
his religious leader, who instructed him that he could receive
forgiveness by faithfully observing the remainder of the fast.
Meanwhile, Ananias ignored the fast by continuing to consume meat.
Prison officials learned of the indiscretions and removed both
prisoners from the diet program. The officials also put them on a one-
month probation, barring them from attending worship services. Did
prison officials substantially burden either Saul's or Ananias's exercise
of religion?
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In the past two decades, Congress has passed the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act' (RFRA) and the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act2 (RLUIPA). These acts prevent federal
and state officials from imposing a "substantial burden" on prisoners'
religious exercise, unless the burden advances "a compelling
governmental interest... and is the least restrictive means of
furthering that... interest."' In accordance with these Acts, prison
officials often allow inmates to read scriptures, attend services, eat
religious foods, and participate in fasts. But what happens if officials
provide accommodations and inmates fail to take advantage of them?
Must prison officials continue accommodating these so-called
"backsliding" prisoners?' Circuits are split over this question.
Specifically, courts have recently disagreed whether it is a
"substantial burden" for prisons to withhold religious diets after
prisoners fail to keep them. In Daly v Davis,' the Seventh Circuit held
that removing a violating prisoner from a kosher food program wasn't
a substantial burden under RFRA.' On the other hand, in Lovelace v
Lee,' the Fourth Circuit held that removing one-time violators from a
fasting program was a substantial burden under the equivalent
RLUIPA standard,' despite a lengthy dissent from Judge J. Harvie
Wilkinson.
This issue requires clarification. Prison officials need to know the
legality of disciplinary measures, and inmates need to know the
consequences of violating religious accommodations. Moreover, the
I Pub L No 103-141,107 Stat 1488 (1993), codified at 42 USC § 2000bb et seq.
2 Pub L No 106-274,114 Stat 803 (2000), codified at 42 USC § 2000cc et seq.
3 RLUIPA § 2(a)(1),42 USC § 2000cc-1(a). RFRA applies outside the prison context:
Government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion even if the
burden results from a rule of general applicability, [unless] ... it demonstrates that [the
burden] ... is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest, [and] is the least
restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.
RFRA § 3(a), 42 USC § 2000bb-1(a)-(b). See also A Jailhouse Lawyer's Manual 727-57 (Columbia
Human Rights Law Review 9th ed 2011), online at http://www3.law.columbia.edu/hrlr/JLM
/Chapter-27.pdf (visited Apr 26,2011).
4 Backsliding is defined as "laps[ing] .. .in the practice of religion." Merriam-Webster,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/backsliding (visited Apr 27, 2011). See also Reed v
Faulkner, 842 F2d 960, 963 (7th Cir 1988) (calling a religious prisoner's decision to eat meat
"backsliding").
5 2009 WL 773880 (7th Cir).
6 Id at *2-3.
7 472 F3d 174 (4th Cir 2006).
8 Id at 187.
9 Id at 204 (Wilkinson concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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circuit split has broad implications: the reasoning in Lovelace and
Daly extends to nondietary religious accommodations. It is therefore
unclear whether prison officials must continue holding religious
services for prisoners who occasionally fail to attend."
This Comment analyzes the current debate and suggests a novel
solution-one that addresses these questions and overcomes the
weaknesses of the current approaches. Part I summarizes the First
Amendment jurisprudence that led to RFRA and RLUIPA and briefly
explains how courts have interpreted these Acts. Part II describes
courts' attempts to determine if removing violating prisoners from
dietary accommodation programs is a substantial burden.
Part III argues that courts are focusing on the wrong issue. Both
sides rush to determine whether removing backsliding prisoners is a
substantial burden, but both overlook the critical prior question: Is
there even a burden on religious exercise? The text and history of
RFRA and RLUIPA indicate that courts first must answer this
question. They also indicate that to answer this question, courts must
know if prisoners hold sincere religious beliefs. I therefore argue that
sincerity should be the determinative inquiry when analyzing the
claims of backsliding prisoners. Unfortunately, courts have not
developed a formal sincerity test in RFRA and RLUIPA cases. Courts
should remedy this problem by applying a modified version of the
sincerity test developed for conscientious objectors to military service
in Witmer v United States." My approach allows sincere but imperfect
prisoners to exercise their beliefs but doesn't force prison officials to
accommodate mendacity.
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
This Part provides historical context for RFRA and RLUIPA.
Part I.A describes how the Supreme Court's holding in Employment
Division v Smith" made it more difficult for individuals to recover
under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Part I.B
explains how Congress responded to Smith by passing RFRA and,
eventually, RLUIPA. Part I.C summarizes how courts have generally
interpreted these statutes.
10 Similarly, must prison officials continue allowing prisoners to attend religious services
after they fail to abide by their religious diets? The Fourth Circuit held that barring attendance is
a substantial burden. See Lovelace,472 F3d at 187-88.
11 348 US 375 (1955).
12 494 US 872 (1990).
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A. Smith and Laws of General Applicability
For decades, the Supreme Court analyzed free exercise claims
under the test announced in Sherbert v Verner." Governments could not
substantially burden an individual's religious practice unless there was a
"compelling state interest" in regulating that practice.14 The Supreme
Court significantly changed free exercise jurisprudence in Smith.
Alfred Smith and Galen Black were employees at a private drug
rehabilitation clinic in Oregon." Smith and Black lost their jobs after
using peyote" as part of a religious ceremony in the Native American
Church. They filed for government unemployment benefits but were
denied because they had been fired for work-related misconduct.
Smith and Black sued, claiming that the state's denial of
unemployment benefits for religiously motivated conduct violated the
Free Exercise Clause."
The Court held that Oregon did not violate the First Amendment.
Rather than invoking Sherbert, however, the Court created a new
standard for analyzing free exercise claims. It stated that neutral laws
of general applicability are valid even if they incidentally burden
religion Under this standard, the Court determined that Oregon
could withhold unemployment benefits from Smith and Black, since
the policy barring claimants dismissed for drug-related reasons wasn't
directed at a particular religion." By rejecting Sherbert's compelling-
interest test, the Supreme Court set the stage for RFRA and
RLUIPA.
B. Congressional Responses to Smith
1. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act.
The Supreme Court's holding in Smith created apprehension
among scholars and believers. Many worried that Smith would leave
13 374 US 398 (1963).
14 See id at 406.
15 Smith, 494 US at 874.
16 The US Drug Enforcement Administration defines peyote as "a small, spineless cactus
... whose principal active ingredient is the hallucinogen mescaline" and notes that "[firom
earliest recorded time, peyote has been used by natives in northern Mexico and the
southwestern United States as a part of their religious rites." See US Drug Enforcement
Administration, Peyote and Mescaline, online at http://www.justice.gov/dea/concern/peyote.html
(visited Apr 26,2011).
17 Smith,494 US at 874.
1s Id at 877-82. See also Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v Hialeah, 508 US 520,533-34,
542-43 (1993) (defining neutral laws of general applicability by, for instance, noting that
neutrality determinations are made based on the purpose of the law).
19 Smith, 494 US at 889.
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religious adherents without judicial recourse in the face of laws that
inadvertently restricted religious exercise.20 Congress responded quickly
and nearly unanimously by passing RFRA.2' RFRA established a new
statutory cause of action for infringements on religious freedom.
The Act states, "Government shall not substantially burden a
person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of
general applicability."2  Government actors can escape liability if they
show that any burden they impose "(1) is in furtherance of a
compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive
means of furthering that compelling governmental interest."23 The
stated goal of this statutory cause of action was to overrule Smith and
to restore the Sherbert balancing test.2
As originally written, RFRA applied to state and federal
government officials." In City of Boerne v Flores,2 however, the Supreme
Court held that RFRA was unconstitutional as applied to states because
it exceeded Congress's limited powers to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment against state actors.27 Despite City of Boerne, RFRA still
applies to the federal government,2 so federal prisoners who do not
receive religious accommodations may bring claims under RFRA.29
2. The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act.
In the wake of City of Boerne, Congress again responded to the
Supreme Court, this time passing RLUIPA. RLUIPA amended
RFRA so that it no longer purported to apply to state actors."o More
importantly, RLUIPA established two new causes of action: one for
landowners" and another for state prisoners.32
State prisoners can recover if prison officials substantially burden
their exercise of religion. The relevant language in RLUIPA is nearly
20 See Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality toward
Religion, 39 DePaul L Rev 993, 1000 (1990) (calling Smith a "stunning opinion" that allowed the
government to "regulate the Mass for good reasons, bad reasons, or no reasons at all").
21 See 139 Cong Rec S 14468,14471 (daily ed Oct 27,1993).
22 RFRA § 3(a),42 USC § 2000bb-1(a).
23 RFRA § 3(b),42 USC § 2000bb-1(b).
24 See RFRA § 2,42 USC § 2000bb.
25 See RFRA § 5(1),42 USC § 2000bb-2(1).
26 521 US 507 (1997).
27 See id at 536.
28 See Gonzales v 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 US 418,423 (2006).
29 See, for example, Daly, 2009 WL 773880 at *2.
30 RLUIPA § 5(h),42 USC § 2000cc-3(h) (specifying that the Act does not preempt state law).
31 RLUIPA § 2, 42 USC § 2000cc (stipulating that, normally, the government may not
implement a land-use regulation that would impose a substantial burden on an individual's
religious exercise).
32 RLUIPA § 3,42 USC § 2000cc-1.
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identical to the language in RFRA: "No government shall impose a
substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or
confined to an institution ... even if the burden results from a rule of
general applicability."33 As under RFRA, government actors are not
liable if they show that the burden "(1) is in furtherance of a
compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive
means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.""
Congress relied on the Spending Clause" rather than the
Fourteenth Amendment to implement RLUIPA. State prisons must
abide by RLUIPA only if they accept federal funds"-though nearly
all state prisons accept such funds." In the only Supreme Court case
interpreting RLUIPA, the Court held that the Act does not violate the
Establishment Clause because it simply restores prisoners' rights that
were removed upon incarceration.
C. The Relationship between RFRA and RLUIPA
Courts generally interpret the relevant standards in RFRA and
RLUIPA uniformly. The substantial-burden language in RFRA and
RLUIPA is practically identical. Also, RLUIPA's history indicates that
both Acts prohibit the same conduct; Congress passed RLUIPA
explicitly to patch a hole in RFRA protection after the Court's City of
Boerne decision. Despite substantial similarities, one difference
between the Acts is that "government" under RFRA means only the
federal government, whereas "government" under RLUIPA means
only state governments. Nevertheless, courts have interpreted the
phrases "substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person" and
"substantially burden a person's exercise of religion" equivalently
under both statutes." Courts rely on RFRA precedents when
interpreting RLUIPA, and vice versa.42 This is an important point
33 RFRA § 3,42 USC § 2000cc-1(a).
34 RFRA § 3,42 USC § 2000cc-1(a).
35 US Const Art I, § 8, cl 1.
36 See RLUIPA § 3, 42 USC § 2000cc-1(b). RLULPA is therefore immune to the
constitutional challenges that limited RFRA. See South Dakota v Dole, 483 US 203,207 (1987).
37 See Benning v Georgia, 391 F3d 1299, 1305-06 (11th Cir 2004). But see Sossamon v
Lone Star State of Texas, 560 F3d 316,330 (5th Cir 2009).
38 See Sarah Kerr, Litigation and Legislation Efforts to Improve Mental Health Treatment
for Prisoners in New York State Prisons, 224 Prison L 153,160 n 25 (2010).
39 See Cutter v Wilkinson, 544 US 709,720 (2005).
40 See text accompanying notes 28-35,39.
41 See Cutter, 544 US at 725 (calling RFRA "the same heightened scrutiny standard as
RLUIPA"); Fowler v Crawford, 534 F3d 931,937-38 (8th Cir 2008).
42 See, for example, Fowler, 534 F3d at 937-38 (holding that a RFRA case "dictate[d] the
outcome" in the RLUIPA case before the court); Daly, 2009 WL 773880 at *2 (citing a RFRA
case to decide a RLUIPA case).
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because some of the cases discussed in Part II rely on RFRA, while
others rely on RLUIPA.
Both Acts incorporate the First Amendment's definition of
"religious exercise."43  Under either Act-as under the First
Amendment-a claimant can recover only if her beliefs are "religious
in nature" and "sincerely held."" I argue below that courts have not
paid sufficient attention to the sincerity requirement in RFRA and
RLUIPA cases.
Neither Act defines "substantial burden." The Supreme Court has
not interpreted the phrase in the context of RFRA or RLUIPA, but
its definition is generally constant across circuits." Lower courts have
concluded that substantial burden has the same meaning under both
Acts46 and that both Acts adopt the Supreme Court's definition of
substantial burden from pre-Smith free exercise cases. In these cases,
a burden is substantial if it "pressure[s]" an adherent "to modify his
behavior and to violate his beliefs."" This pressure can result either
from government officials conditioning a benefit on the adherent
violating her beliefs or from penalizing an adherent for practicing her
beliefs.
In sum, a prisoner who brings a RFRA or RLUIPA claim must
show that prison officials burdened her exercise of religion and that
the burden is substantial. If a prisoner proves both elements, prison
43 See Part III.A.2.
44 Africa v Pennsylvania, 662 F2d 1025,1030 (3d Cir 1981). See also A Jailhouse Lawyer's
Manual at 734-35, 738 n 109 (cited in note 3); Lovelace, 472 F3d at 187 n 2 ("RLUIPA bars
inquiry into whether [the] belief or practice is central to a prisoner's religion. RLUIPA does not,
however, preclude inquiry into the sincerity of a prisoner's professed religiosity.") (quotation
marks and citations omitted).
45 See Lovelace, 472 F3d at 187 ("[Clircuits have articulated generally consistent
definitions of 'substantial burden' under RLUIPA."). But see Scott Budzenski, Comment, Tug of
War: The Supreme Court, Congress, and the Circuits- The Fifth Circuit's Input on the Struggle to
Define a Prisoner's Right to Religious Freedom in Adkins v. Kaspar, 80 St John's L Rev 1335,
1346-50 (2006).
46 See, for example, Fowler, 534 F3d at 937-38; Daly, 2009 WL 773880 at *2-3. See also
A Jailhouse Lawyer's Manual at 727 (cited in note 3).
47 See Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v Chicago, 342 F3d 752, 760-61 (7th Cir 2003),
quoting 146 Cong Rec S 16700 (July 27,2000) (Joint Statement of Sen Hatch and Sen Kennedy)
("The term 'substantial burden' as used in [RLUIPA] is not intended to be given any broader
interpretation than the Supreme Court's articulation of the concept of substantial burden of
religious exercise."); Lovelace, 472 F3d at 187 ("We likewise follow the Supreme Court's
guidance in the Free Exercise Clause context.").
48 Lovelace, 472 F3d at 187, quoting Thomas v Review Board, 450 US 707, 718 (1981)
(explaining the free exercise substantial-burden standard).
49 See Lovelace, 472 F3d at 187 ("[A substantial burden] forces a person to 'choose
between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting [governmental] benefits, on the one
hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion ... on the other hand."'), quoting
Sherbert, 374 US at 404. See also Midrash Sephardi, Inc v Surfside, 366 F3d 1214, 1227 (11th Cir
2004); Adkins v Kaspar, 393 F3d 559,570 (5th Cir 2004).
14372011]1
The University of Chicago Law Review
officials must show a compelling interest and the use of the least
restrictive means. Part II demonstrates that courts currently analyze
the claims of backsliding prisoners by focusing on the second
element-whether a burden is substantial. Part III argues that the
emphasis is misplaced. Courts should focus on the first element-
whether there is a burden on religious exercise. The first element is
particularly relevant when dealing with backsliding prisoners, since
backsliding raises doubts about the sincerity of the prisoner's beliefs.
II. WAYWARD PRISONERS: SUBSTANTIAL BURDEN?
Federal and state prison officials are required to make
accommodations for prisoners' religious dietary needs. For example,
state prison officials may be liable under RLUIPA if they do not offer
kosher food to Jewish prisoners." Nevertheless, courts have disagreed
about the implications of a prisoner's failing to take advantage of
accommodations. Specifically, courts have disagreed whether removing
backsliding prisoners from accommodation programs is a substantial
burden under RFRA and RLUIPA. Part II.A discusses cases in the
Seventh and Eighth Circuits, which conclude that removal isn't a
substantial burden. Part II.B discusses cases in the Fourth and Sixth
Circuits, which conclude otherwise. Part II.C summarizes the debate.
A. Removing Backsliding Prisoners Is Not a Substantial Burden
In Brown-El v Harris,2 the Eighth Circuit held that suspending the
religious meals of a prisoner who had violated the Ramadan fast was
permissible." Keith Brown-El was a Muslim prisoner at a Missouri state
prison. He participated in a program that allowed him to eat specially
prepared meals after dark so he could observe the Ramadan fast. The
program's written policy stated that officials would remove prisoners
who ate meals during daytime. Brown-El fought a prison guard and was
placed in the infirmary, where he voluntarily ate a daytime meal. The
prison then removed Brown-El from the fasting program. Brown-El
first claimed that his religion made an exception for adherents who
were injured but didn't offer any evidence of this tenet."
Brown-El's second claim was that even if he broke his religious
fast by eating daytime food, removal for a single infraction violated his
First Amendment rights. The Eighth Circuit rejected this claim, holding
50 See 28 CFR § 548.20.
51 See, for example, Colvin v Caruso, 605 F3d 282,289 (6th Cir 2010).
52 26 F3d 68 (8th Cir 1994).
53 See id at 69-70.
54 See id.
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that "[t]he policy did not coerce worshippers 'into violating their
religious beliefs; nor [did it compel] them, by threat of sanctions, to
refrain from religiously motivated conduct.""' In other words, removing
accommodations when a prisoner fails to take advantage of them does
not substantially burden the exercise of religion because there is no
pressure. In such cases, the prisoner chooses to remove herself by
rejecting an accommodation. The court analyzed this claim under the
First Amendment, but the court stated that Brown-El's claim would
similarly fail under RFRA's substantial-burden requirement."
The Seventh Circuit recently analyzed a similar RFRA claim and
reached the same conclusion." James Daly, a Jewish inmate in a
federal penitentiary, participated in a program that allowed prisoners
to receive kosher food. Prison guards saw Daly eating nonkosher food
on three separate occasions. Daly was temporarily removed from the
program each time."
As a federal prisoner, Daly brought his claim under RFRA. The
Seventh Circuit held that the federal prison was justified in removing
Daly from the dietary accommodation program.5 The court stated that
removal was not a substantial burden because it did not "compel
conduct contrary to religious beliefs: Daly was forced to eat the non-
kosher meals only because he turned down the kosher ones."O Much
like the Eighth Circuit, the Seventh Circuit held that removing a
straying prisoner from an accommodation program was not a
substantial burden because the prisoner voluntarily opted out of the
program by choosing to violate personal religious beliefs.
Daly also claimed that prison officials failed to "establish that his
suspension was the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling
governmental interest,"6' as required under RFRA. But the court stated
this argument "puts the cart before the horse."62 The compelling-interest
inquiry is relevant only after a prisoner shows that prison officials
substantially burdened religious exercise.
55 Id at 70, citing United States v Means, 858 F2d 404,407 (8th Cir 1988).
56 Brown-El, 26 F3d at 69. Even though Brown-El was in a state prison, the court analyzed his
claim under RFRA because, at the time, courts still assumed the Act was valid against state actors
57 See Daly, 2009 WL 773880 at *2.
58 Id at *1.
59 See id at *2.
60 Id.
61 Daly, 2009 WL 773880 at *2.
62 Id, quoting Navajo Nation v United States Forest Service, 535 F3d 1058,1076 (9th Cir 2008).
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B. Removing Backsliding Prisoners Is a Substantial Burden
In Lovelace, the Fourth Circuit disagreed with the Seventh and
Eighth Circuits' discussions of substantial burden." Like the prison in
Brown-El, a Virginia state prison accommodated Muslim prisoners
during Ramadan by allowing them to eat before sunrise and after
sunset." Prisoners who violated the fast were unable to continue
participating. A prison guard accused Leroy Lovelace of eating a
daytime meal after Lovelace had complained of rotten milk. Although
the guard later admitted he had been confused, Lovelace was
removed from the program." Adding insult to injury, prison officials
did not allow him to participate in worship services or group prayers.
Lovelace sued under RLUIPA.
The Fourth Circuit held that the Virginia prison placed a
substantial burden on Lovelace's exercise of religion because he was
under "pressure ... to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs."
The court stated that removing Lovelace from the fasting program
substantially burdened his religious exercise if he had not violated the
fast by eating during the day." But the court went further. It also
stated that the prison's policy of removing violating inmates from
accommodation programs was a substantial burden." In other words,
the prison policy was a substantial burden on Lovelace's exercise of
religion, regardless of whether Lovelace had broken his fast. The court
noted it was irrelevant "that the burden on Lovelace's religious
exercise resulted from discipline ... rather than from the prison's
failure to accommodate."o
Because Lovelace had shown that the prison's policy substantially
burdened his exercise of religion, the burden shifted to the prison to
show that the burden furthered "a compelling governmental interest;
and [was] the least restrictive means of furthering that ... interest.""
Prison officials asserted that they had a "legitimate interest in
removing inmates from religious dietary programs where the inmate
flouts prison rules."" The court held that this interest was inadequate.
It remanded the case to allow prison officials to "provid[e] an
63 Lovelace, 472 F3d at 208 (Wilkinson concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting
that the majority's holding puts the court at tension with the Eighth Circuit).
64 Id at 182-83 (majority).
65 Id at 183-84.
66 Id at 187.
67 Lovelace, 472 F3d at 187, quoting Thomas, 450 US at 718.
68 Lovelace, 472 F3d at 187.
69 Id at 188.
70 Id.
71 RLUIPA § 3,42 USC § 2000cc-1(a).
72 Lovelace, 472 F3d at 190.
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explanation for the policy's restrictions that takes into account any
institutional need to maintain good order, security, and discipline or to
control costs."" The policy would also need to be the least restrictive
means of furthering the interest.7
The court's opinion elicited a strong dissent from Judge
Wilkinson. He agreed with the Eighth Circuit that prison officials
need not continue accommodating backsliding prisoners." Judge
Wilkinson also argued that a prisoner's violation of dietary restrictions
was presumptive evidence of religious insincerity.6 Finally, he accused
the majority of "[d]isregarding the deference historically accorded
prison administrators," predicting that "[t]he only certainty that the
majority guarantees is litigation over matters large and small, with
federal courts thrust into a role they have sought assiduously to
avoid -that of micromanaging state prisons."77
Although Lovelace sued under RLUIPA and Daly sued under
RFRA, the resulting disagreement between the Fourth and Seventh
Circuits is not simply a result of courts applying two different statutes.
After all, RFRA and RLUIPA use equivalent language and courts
have consistently held that "substantial burden" has the same meaning
under both Acts.
The Sixth Circuit sided with the Lovelace majority in dicta. In
Colvin v Caruso," the court considered whether state prison officials
had violated RLUIPA when they removed Kenneth Colvin from a
kosher meal program after he had eaten nonkosher food on multiple
occasions." Although the court dismissed Colvin's RLUIPA claim as
moot,' it noted that the prison's "policy of removing a prisoner from
the kosher-meal program for mere possession of a non-kosher food
item may be overly restrictive of inmates' religious rights."" The District
of New Hampshire similarly expressed skepticism about the validity of
a policy that removed violating prisoners from religious dietary
programs." The court stated that "[w]hile the prison certainly has a valid
73 Id.
74 Id at 191.
75 See id at 207 (Wilkinson concurring in part and dissenting in part).
76 Lovelace, 472 F3d at 207 (Wilkinson concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The
Keen Mountain policy accommodates Ramadan observance only for those inmates who actually
observe the Ramadan fast. Such a sincerity requirement is in no way a substantial burden on
religious exercise.").
77 Id at 204 (citations omitted).
78 See Part I.C.
79 605 F3d 282 (6th Cir 2010).
80 See id at 286-87.
81 Id at 289.
82 Id at 296.
83 See Kuperman v Warden, 2009 WL 4042760, *6 (D NH).
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interest in weeding out insincere requests for religious diets, there is
some question whether that interest is truly compelling."4
C. Summarizing the Debate
It is "open to question" whether prison officials violate RLUIPA
or RFRA when they remove prisoners from religious dietary programs
after prisoners break their religious commitment." Both sides agree that
substantial burden is the critical issue. They merely disagree whether
removal "put[s] substantial pressure on an adherent ... to violate his
beliefs.""
In Daly, the Seventh Circuit held that removing wayward
adherents is not a substantial burden under RFRA, since they
"choose" to remove themselves when they choose to violate their
beliefs." Under this view, prisoners are not under pressure to violate
their beliefs because they can remain in the program simply by not
violating their religion's dietary restrictions. The Eighth Circuit agreed
with this conclusion in dicta." In Lovelace, the Fourth Circuit reached
the opposite result under RLUIPA. In the court's view, it didn't matter
if expulsion from the program was the result of a voluntary choice. It
mattered only that the prisoner was unable to practice his religion
after removal.89 The Sixth Circuit and the District of New Hampshire
agreed with this conclusion in dicta.
Part III argues that courts should shift the inquiry away from
substantial burden and on to religious sincerity. My solution also
addresses the broader implications of this circuit split. In particular,
the disagreement centers on the narrow issue of dietary
accommodations, but the courts' reasoning seems to extend to other
instances of religious accommodations. The Fourth Circuit held that
preventing Lovelace from attending worship services was a substantial
burden even though he had broken his fast." But courts on the other
side of the split have not stated their views on this issue.
III. TESTING THE SINCERITY OF RFRA AND RLUIPA CLAIMANTS
This Part resolves the circuit split by developing a new
framework for analyzing prisoners' RFRA and RLUIPA claims. I
8 Id.
85 Id at *7.
86 Thomas, 450 US at 718.
87 2009 WL 773880 at *2.
88 See Brown-El,26 F3d at 69.
89 See Lovelace, 472 F3d at 187.
90 See Colvin, 605 F3d at 296; Kuperman, 2009 WL 4042760 at *6.
91 See Lovelace, 472 F3d at 187.
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argue that the inquiry in both Daly and Lovelace is misguided: the
relevant question is not whether removing prisoners from
accommodation programs is a substantial burden but whether
prisoners have sincere beliefs. If courts know that a prisoner's beliefs
are sincere, it becomes apparent that removal is a substantial burden
under the Acts. Part III.A derives this framework from the Acts
themselves. Part III.B discusses the advantages of a sincerity-centered
approach. Part III.C applies the approach to Saul and Ananias, the
hypothetical prisoners from the Introduction.
A. Religious Sincerity as the Determinative Inquiry
1. RFRA and RLUIPA codified pre-Smith jurisprudence,
indicating burdens are substantial only if beliefs are sincere.
This Section argues that RFRA and RLUIPA codified the pre-
Smith definition of "substantial burden," which developed in a line of
free exercise cases starting with Sherbert. I show that under pre-Smith
jurisprudence, removing violating prisoners from accommodation
programs generally is a substantial burden -but only if prisoners have
sincere beliefs. This suggests that the proper inquiry in RFRA and
RLUIPA cases is whether the prisoner's desire to continue receiving
accommodations is motivated by sincere beliefs.
Congress passed RFRA in response to the Supreme Court's
decision in Smith." Smith held that neutral laws of general
applicability are valid under the Free Exercise Clause, even if they
incidentally burden religion." There are at least three reasons courts
should interpret "substantial burden" under RFRA the same way
courts used the term before Smith.
First, RFRA's stated purpose is to return to pre-Smith free
exercise jurisprudence. The Act states that Smith "virtually eliminated
the requirement that the government justify burdens on religious
exercise imposed by [neutral laws]."94 The Act further states that "the
compelling interest test as set forth in prior Federal court rulings is a
workable test for striking sensible balances."" The Act then declares
its purposes:
[T]o restore the compelling interest test as set forth in [Sherbert]
and [Wisconsin v Yoder] and to guarantee its application in all
92 See notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
93 494 US at 885.
94 RFRA § 2(a)(4),42 USC § 2000bb(a)(4).
95 RFRA § 2(a)(5), 42 USC § 2000bb(a)(5) (explaining that the balances struck are
between religious liberty and competing prior governmental interest).
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cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened;
and to provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious
exercise is substantially burdened by government.
This express attempt to codify pre-Smith free exercise jurisprudence
indicates that courts should interpret the statute according to pre-
Smith case law.
Second, RFRA incorporates the phrase "substantially burden,""
wording that the Supreme Court frequently used in pre-Smith case
law. In Thomas v Review Board," the Court stated, "Where the
state ... [puts] substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his
behavior and to violate his beliefs, a burden upon religion exists.
While the compulsion may be indirect, the infringement upon free
exercise is nonetheless substantial."" References to substantial
burdens or infringements also appeared in Sherbert and Wisconsin v
Yoder," along with a number of Supreme Court decisions in the
latter half of the twentieth century.'o RFRA's textual incorporation
of an oft-repeated phrase, along with the stated attempt to return to
pre-Smith jurisprudence, indicates that RFRA adopted the Supreme
Court's definition.
Third, circuit courts have agreed that RFRA and RLUIPA
adopted the meaning of substantial burden from pre-Smith cases.
Notably, the split courts discussed in this Comment agree that a
substantial burden exists when the state places "pressure on an
adherent... to violate his beliefs,"'0 thereby embracing the language
from Thomas. The near unanimity among the circuits, along with the
arguments discussed above, provides strong evidence that RFRA
adopted the Supreme Court's pre-Smith definition of substantial
burden."
Related factors suggest that RLUIPA incorporated the same
definition of substantial burden. Congress passed RLUIPA after the
Court held that RFRA did not apply to state actors, and the statute
96 RFRA § 2(b)(1)-(2), 42 USC § 2000bb(b)(1)-(2) (emphasis added). See also Sherbert,
374 US at 40304; Wisconsin v Yoder,406 US 205,218 (1972).
97 RFRA § 3(a), 42 USC § 2000bb-1(a).
98 450 US 707 (1981).
99 Id at 717-18 (emphasis added).
100 406 US 205 (1972).
lot See Sherbert, 374 US at 406 ("substantial infringement"); Yoder, 406 US at 218
("substantially interfering"); Hobbie v Unemployment Appeals Commission, 480 US 136, 141
(1987), citing Thomas, 450 US at 717 ("substantial pressure"); Hernandez v Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, 490 US 680,699 (1989) ("substantial burden").
102 Lovelace, 472 F3d at 187; Daly, 2009 WL 773880 at *2-3. Both cases cited the standard in
Thomas,450 US at 717-18.
103 See also 146 Cong Rec at S 16700 (cited in note 47).
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contains nearly identical language. As a result, courts have recognized
that RLUIPA also adopted the pre-Smith definition of substantial
burden."
As noted above, Lovelace and Daly agreed with this analysis.
Both cases assumed that RFRA and RLUIPA adopted the pre-Smith
definition of substantial burden. In light of this agreement, it is
surprising that neither took the next step. Neither court asked if
removing accommodations from a violating prisoner is a substantial
burden under pre-Smith law. Instead of examining precedent, both
courts asked simply whether officials pressured or compelled the
prisoners to violate their beliefs.'o The courts' laconic explanations
make it difficult to understand why they reached opposing
conclusions. Fortunately, a principle revealed in pre-Smith Supreme
Court cases answers the substantial-burden question.
To determine if eliminating accommodations would have been a
substantial burden pre-Smith, it may be helpful to start with an
analogy. Assume that workers can receive state unemployment
benefits after voluntarily quitting jobs, but only if they quit for good
cause. In most cases, workers have good cause if they quit because a
job forced them to violate their religious beliefs." Tom quit because
he was transferred to a factory manufacturing tank parts, and creating
weapons violates his religious beliefs. Before his transfer to the tank
factory, Tom worked in a steel factory. It is reasonable to assume that
the steel was ultimately used in weapons. Pre-Smith, could the
government withhold otherwise required accommodations-
unemployment benefits -because Tom either had violated his beliefs
or was at least inconsistent?
This was the story in Thomas. The Indiana Supreme Court held
that denying Eddie Thomas unemployment benefits didn't violate his
free exercise rights because it was "unclear what his belief was, and
what the religious basis of his belief was.,,.o. The US Supreme Court
reversed, finding that the denial of benefits placed a substantial
burden on his religious exercise. Thomas "was put to a choice between
fidelity to religious belief or cessation of work.". It did not matter
that it "was reasonable to assume" he had previously worked on steel
104 See Lovelace, 472 F3d at 187. See also Fowler v Crawford, 534 F3d 931, 937-38 (8th Cir
2008) (holding that a RFRA case "dictate[d] the outcome" in the RLUIPA case before the court).
105 Compare Lovelace, 472 F3d at 187 ("[A] 'substantial burden' is one that 'put[s]
substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs."'), with
Daly, 2009 WL 773880 at *2 ("[T]he program [does not] compel conduct contrary to religious
beliefs.").
106 See Bowen v Roy, 476 US 693,708 (1986).
107 Thomas v Review Board,391 NE2d 1127,1133 (Ind 1979).
10 Thomas, 450 US at 717.
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used in war."9 It only mattered that Thomas sincerely believed his
religion barred him from working on tank parts at the time he quit his
job and requested the religious accommodation."'
Thomas indicates that the substantial-burden inquiry is
temporally limited to the point in time when the claimant requests an
accommodation. Another pre-Smith case reflects this principle. After
working at a jewelry store for over two years, Paula Hobbie became a
Seventh-Day Adventist. She refused to work on Saturdays and lost
her job. Florida then denied her request for unemployment benefits.
In Hobbie v Unemployment Appeals Commission," the Court held
that Florida had behaved improperly. The Court reached this
conclusion by determining that a sincere religious belief motivated
Hobbie at the time she stopped working on Saturdays-her past
behavior was irrelevant.12
These cases resolve the substantial-burden question in the prison
context. Courts should ignore past conduct-including past
violations-and simply ask if removal prevents the prisoner from
exercising sincerely held religious beliefs. If so, the burden is
substantial. Because removing prisoners from dietary programs makes
it impossible for them to maintain religious diets, removal is a
substantial burden on prisoners motivated by sincere religious beliefs.
The rules of construction accompanying RLUIPA strengthen the
conclusion that removing sincere prisoners from accommodation
programs for past violations is a substantial burden: "This chapter
shall be construed in favor of a broad protection of religious exercise,
to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of this chapter and the
Constitution.,.. The "broad protection" and "maximum extent"
language indicates that courts should err on the side of finding
substantial burdens.
One possible objection is that the substantial-burden inquiry
doesn't apply to prisoners. As demonstrated in O'Lone v Shabazz,"'
courts did not apply Sherbert's substantial-burden framework to
prisoners before Smith. Instead, courts applied a standard of review
that was more deferential to officials' "legitimate penological
109 Id at 711 n 3.
110 See id at 716-18. See also id at 715 ("We see, therefore, that Thomas drew a line, and it is
not for us to say that the line he drew was an unreasonable one.").
111 480 US 136 (1987).
112 See id at 144 ("The timing of Hobbie's conversion is immaterial to our determination
that her free exercise rights have been burdened; the salient inquiry under the Free Exercise
Clause is the burden involved.").
113 RLUIPA § 5(g),42 USC § 2000cc-3(g).
114 482 US 342 (1987).
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interests.""' But RFRA implicitly rejected O'Lone by not preserving
O'Lone's prison exception. Moreover, RLUIPA explicitly rejected
O'Lone by overtly extending the substantial-burden inquiry to
prisoners. Thus, neither RFRA nor RLUIPA maintains the
penological interests exception.
The Fourth Circuit was therefore correct in holding that
Lovelace's removal from the fasting program was a substantial
burden. But my acceptance of Lovelace comes with a caveat: rules
prohibiting behavior should be considered substantial burdens if and
only if the behavior is religiously motivated. The relevant question in
accommodation cases is whether prisoners have sincere beliefs. While
past violations are not relevant to the substantial-burden question,
they are to the sincerity question.
2. The pre-Smith definition of "religious exercise" indicates that
sincerity is the determinative issue in backsliding cases.
This Section notes that RFRA and RLUIPA also codified the
pre-Smith definition of religious exercise. I discuss religious exercise
under pre-Smith jurisprudence and demonstrate that sincerity is an
important element. I also show that courts generally recognize
sincerity as the determinative question in analogous backsliding cases
under the Free Exercise Clause. These propositions strengthen my
conclusion above: the key issue in analyzing backsliding prisoners'
RFRA and RLUIPA claims is sincerity of beliefs.
Various factors suggest that RFRA and RLUIPA assumed the
pre-Smith definition of religious exercise. For example, they
incorporated a specific phrase used both in the Constitution and in
Sherbert jurisprudence. More importantly, an amended section of
RFRA states "the term 'exercise of religion' means religious exercise,
as defined in [RLUIPA].""
Under pre-Smith case law, courts first determined whether a
belief or act qualified as religious exercise before asking if an alleged
burden was substantial. Courts asked two questions: Are the beliefs
"religious in nature," and are they "sincerely held"?"' Determining if
beliefs are religious is "a most delicate question."" In general, courts
have examined factors such as whether the alleged religion addresses
115 id at 349.
116 RFRA § 5(1),42 USC § 2000bb-2(4).
117 Africa v Pennsylvania, 662 F2d 1025,1030 (3d Cir 1981).
118 Yoder,406 US at 215.
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fundamental life questions, is comprehensive, and has a formal
organizational structure."'
Even if a court finds that beliefs are religious, the court may still
ask whether a claimant sincerely holds the beliefs. As the Supreme
Court stated in United States v Seeger,12" "[W]hile the 'truth' of a belief
is not open to question, there remains the significant question whether
it is 'truly held.' This is the threshold question of sincerity which must
be resolved in every case."21 In accordance with these principles, the
Supreme Court held that it would be improper for a jury to determine
whether Guy Ballard, "alias Saint Germain, Jesus, George Washington,
and Godfre Ray King," had indeed been designated as a divine
messenger.1' Still, the jury was free to determine whether the
defendants-who collected $3 million from their followers based on
these claims -sincerely held their beliefs.
A series of free exercise cases strengthen the conclusion that the
relevant question is whether prisoners' beliefs are sincere. In these
cases, courts have recognized that violations of beliefs-whether
before or after the occurrence of alleged burdens-are an indication
of insincerity, not a factor that influences the burden inquiry.
In Reed v Faulkner,12 the Seventh Circuit examined a prisoner's
free exercise claim. The prisoner had previously consumed meat and
shaved his beard. Both actions were contrary to his stated religious
beliefs. The court held that the plaintiff's backsliding was relevant to
the question of sincerity- though not conclusive."' In Shaheed-
Muhammad v Dipaolo,12 the prisoner ate meat before requesting a
vegetarian diet. The federal district court concluded that past
violations were relevant to the question of sincerity, not the question
of burden.12 Similarly, the Superior Court of New Jersey held that a
worker's previous Sunday labors, along with his willingness to work on
Sunday after he was fired, influenced the sincerity analysis.*
In light of such cases, it is unfortunate that Lovelace and Daly
framed the issue as one of burden, and not of sincerity-especially
119 See, for example, Africa, 662 F2d at 1032 (explaining various factors the Supreme Court
has considered in different cases). See also Welsh v United States, 398 US 333, 343 (1970), citing
United States v Seeger, 380 US 163,186 (1965); Seeger, 380 US at 176.
120 380 US 163 (1965).
121 Id at 185.
122 See United States v Ballard, 322 US 78,79 (1944).
123 See id at 84,89-90.
124 842 F2d 960 (7th Cir 1988).
125 See id at 963.
126 393 F Supp 2d 80 (D Mass 2005).
127 Id at 90-91.
128 See Sepulveda v Borne Holding Co, 2010 WL 5345127, *4-5 (NJ Super 2010).
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since pre-Smith law seemingly resolves the issue of burden. The
Supreme Court itself has stated that "[RLUIPA] does not preclude
inquiry into the sincerity of a prisoner's professed religiosity."'" In fact,
sincerity of beliefs is the "threshold inquiry of any religious
accommodation claim."' And even under O'Lone's penological
interest test, the Supreme Court noted that prisoners must have
sincere beliefs."' Why, then, have courts seemingly skipped over this
threshold question when analyzing backsliding prisoners' RFRA and
RLUIPA claims?
One possible explanation is that courts are relying on
unexpressed tests for sincerity. The Lovelace court mentioned in a
footnote that "[t]here is no dispute that Lovelace sincerely holds his
religious beliefs."'. The court may have assumed that any prisoner
who claims to be religious is likely to be sincere, so past violations are
irrelevant. Or perhaps the government simply failed to recognize that
backsliding can be evidence of insincerity. On the other hand, Daly
and Brown-El may have assumed that prior religious violations are
conclusive evidence of insincerity. Neither court expressly found
insincerity, but at least the Seventh Circuit seemed skeptical that
Daly's beliefs were sincere.'
The assumption that past violations are conclusive evidence of
insincerity seemingly motivated Judge Wilkinson's Lovelace dissent.,
He claimed that the policy of removing one-time violators was valid
"because it is keyed to what the Supreme Court has told us a policy
may rightly be keyed to: the sincerity of a religious belief, rather than
its truth."35 He later stated that "[t]he policy was designed to
accommodate only sincere observers by the most reliable indicator
possible: the would-be observers' own religious practice."'
129 Cutter, 544 US at 725 n 13.
130 Lovelace, 472 F3d at 207 (Wilkinson concurring in part and dissenting in part), citing
Seeger, 380 US at 185 ("[Wjhile the 'truth' of a belief is not open to question, there remains the
significant question whether it is 'truly held.' This is the threshold question of sincerity which
must be resolved in every case.").
131 See O'Lone, 482 US at 359 ("The Court in this case acknowledges that 'respondents'
sincerely held religious beliefs compe[l] attendance at Jumu'ah.').
132 Lovelace, 472 F3d at 187 n 2.
133 Daly, 2009 WL 773880 at *1 (noting that "Daly was suspended three times from the
program because he was observed purchasing and eating non-kosher food and trading his kosher
tray for a regular non-kosher tray.").
134 See Lovelace, 472 F3d at 207 (Wilkinson concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The
Keen Mountain policy accommodates Ramadan observance only for those inmates who actually
observe the Ramadan fast. Such a sincerity requirement is in no way a substantial burden on
religious exercise.").
135 Id at 205.
136 Id at 208.
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It is troubling that courts might be relying on unexpressed
sincerity tests. Both possible approaches are problematic because
neither backsliding nor statements of belief are perfect proxies for
sincerity. The Seventh Circuit recognized this when holding that past
violations are evidence of insincerity, though not conclusive."' But
there is a deeper problem with these possible unstated assumptions:
they hide the courts' true standards. If sincerity is the determinative
issue in RFRA and RLUIPA cases, courts should address the issue
openly-not through implicit and imperfect proxies.
Another possible explanation for the misguided focus on burden
is that no standardized sincerity test has emerged in RFRA and
RLUIPA cases. Courts may therefore be more comfortable trying to
fit the question of accommodation into the burden framework. As
noted above, this oblique attempt is improper under the stated
purpose and text of RFRA and RLUIPA.
3. Courts have developed a practical test for determining the
sincerity of conscientious objectors.
This Section discusses the advantages and disadvantages of testing
religious beliefs for sincerity. I identify various provisions of the US
Code that require sincerity testing. Only one provision has been
significantly litigated: the statute exempting conscientious objectors
from military service. I discuss factors that courts and military review
boards have examined when determining sincerity.
Sincerity testing became important after cases such as Sherbert
allowed religious believers to receive exemptions from general laws."'
Religion-based exemptions create incentives for people to feign
religiosity."' Courts typically deal with these incentives by reading
sincerity requirements into federal statutes granting religious exemptions.
For example, unlike most applicants for citizenship, some religious
applicants need not pledge a willingness to bear arms in defense of the
United States, but their beliefs must be sincere.140 Certain religious
believers may opt out of Social Security taxes.141 Members of Indian tribes
137 Reed, 842 F2d at 963.
138 See Sherbert, 374 US at 409-10. See also William P. Marshall, Solving the Free Exercise
Dilemma: Free Exercise as Expression, 67 Minn L Rev 545,554 n 58 (1983).
139 See James D. Nelson, Incarceration, Accommodation, and Strict Scrutiny, 95 Va L
Rev 2053,2055 (2009).
140 See In re Weizman, 426 F2d 439,455 (8th Cir 1970).
141 See 26 USC § 1402(e)(1). See also 26 USC § 170.
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may hunt bald eagles for "religious purposes."42 Religious ministers are
not subject to fines for discriminatory hiring.143
Despite widespread judicial approval, sincerity testing is difficult
for several reasons. A fact finder's personal religious beliefs may affect
her perceptions of sincerity. For example, Christians may doubt the
sincerity of Muslims' belief in Ramadan. Justice Robert Jackson voiced
this concern soon after courts began sincerity testing: "[Religious]
experiences, like some tones and colors, have existence for one, but
none at all for another. They cannot be verified to the minds of those
whose field of consciousness does not include religious insight."'"
Another difficulty is that the relationship between sincerity and
belief is conceptually unclear. As Judge John Noonan pointed out,
"Faith is faith because it cannot be demonstrated. A degree of doubt is
therefore always possible.".45 How certain in convictions must one be
to pass a sincerity test? Judge Noonan expressed concern that a priest
who had lost his faith could be guilty of fraud for saying Mass.' The
Supreme Court alleviated some of these concerns in Thomas. It held
that Indiana had violated Thomas's free exercise rights, even though
Thomas "was 'struggling' with his beliefs."47 Sincerity does not require
certainty.
Finally, religious sincerity is difficult to prove. Prisoners may
know if their beliefs are sincere, but prison officials and courts cannot.
In cases of unverifiable, asymmetric information, fact finders must
look to observable evidence that tends to confirm the information.
Courts generally examine objective evidence-such as behavior or
statements-to prove or disprove the existence of subjective beliefs.
Despite the potential drawbacks of sincerity testing, certain
government programs give benefits only to religious adherents. As the
Supreme Court has recognized, screening is necessary in these
situations -otherwise, the risk of fraud may be high. 44 Most sincerity
tests fail to grapple with the shortcomings outlined above. Also, courts
generally do not have well-defined tests for religious sincerity.14
142 See 16 USC § 668A; Gibson v Babbitt, 223 F3d 1256,1258 (11th Cir 2000).
143 See 42 USC §§ 2000e-1-2000e-2. See, for example, Hernandez v Catholic Bishop of
Chicago, 320 F3d 698,703-404 (7th Cir 2003).
144 Ballard, 322 US at 93 (Jackson dissenting).
145 John T. Noonan Jr, How Sincere Do You Have to Be to Be Religious?, 1988 U Ill L
Rev 713,718.
146 See id at 719. See also Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding
of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 Harv L Rev 1409,1417 n 26, 1420 (1990) (noting the objection
that "determining the 'sincerity' of religious claimants is dangerously intrusive").
147 Thomas, 450 US at 715.
148 See Ballard,322 US at 84 (discussing the screening done by the jury).
149 See Bryan M. Likins, Note, Determining the Appropriate Definition of Religion and
Obligation to Accommodate the Religious Employee under Title VII: A Comparison of Religious
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Courts are often unclear about which party bears the burden of proof
and what evidence is permissible. One notable exception is § 6(j) of
the Universal Military Training and Service Act.' 0
Section 6(j) allows conscientious objectors to avoid induction into
the United States Armed Forces. The statute exempts anyone "who, by
reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to
participation in war in any form."'. An objector seeking exemption
must make a short statement of religious beliefs and cite relevant
evidence. If the local draft board determines the objector's beliefs are
sincere, the draftee is exempted from conscription.
In Witmer, a local draft board determined that Philip Witmer's
beliefs were insincere and denied the § 6(j) exemption.'52 The board
based its decision on Witmer's "inconsistent" claims: he initially
sought exemption as a farmer, then as an ordained minister, and
finally as a conscientious objector. The Supreme Court reaffirmed the
standard for reviewing board decisions established in an earlier case.
Courts should overturn a board's determination of sincerity only if it
has "no basis in fact."'.
In addition to affirming the "no basis in fact" standard, the
Supreme Court clarified which facts are relevant in making and
reviewing sincerity determinations. "In these cases, objective facts are
relevant only insofar as they help in determining the sincerity of the
registrant in his claimed belief, purely a subjective question. In
conscientious objector cases, therefore, any fact which casts doubt on
the veracity of the registrant is relevant."'. Applying this standard to
Witmer, the Court affirmed the board's determination. It based its
decision on Witmer's supposedly inconsistent claims and his failure to
produce prior evidence of religious convictions.
Lower courts have interpreted Witmer capaciously, examining a
wide range of evidence when reviewing military boards' sincerity
determinations. Many of these decisions are highly fact specific, so it is
often unclear how the holding in one case applies to others. Still, in the
many cases since Witmer, courts have repeatedly emphasized a few
specific factors. One important factor is the objector's testimony
before the review board. In Witmer itself, the Court stated that review
boards should consider whether the registrant's "demeanor appeared
Discrimination Protection in the United States and United Kingdom, 21 Ind Intl & Comp L
Rev 111,116 (2011).
1so Pub L No 82-51,65 Stat 75 (1951), codified as amended at 50 USC App § 451 et seq.
151 Universal Military Training and Service Act § 1(q), 50 USC App § 456(j).
152 Witmer, 348 US at 396-97.
153 Id at 381, citing Estep v United States, 327 US 114,122 (1946).
154 Witmer, 348 US at 381-82 (emphasis added).
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shifty or evasive or that his appearance was one of unreliability."55 If
the review board concludes that the registrant's testimony is
untrustworthy, it can deny an exemption. Nevertheless, under the "no
basis in fact" review standard, the government generally must allege
other objective facts to uphold the denial of exemption on review.
Courts have emphasized at least five other factors when
determining sincerity. Many of these factors are also relevant to
prisoners. The first two are from Witmer. The Witmer Court based its
conclusion on inconsistent claims and a lack of preinduction evidence
of beliefs. Lower courts continue to rely on these factors. For example,
the First Circuit recently considered the claim of a student who
attended medical school on an army scholarship, then requested
exemption shortly before she was scheduled to report for active duty.'
The court upheld her exemption. It focused on inconsistency-in
particular, whether it was inconsistent for her to claim that she was
driven but also religiously uncertain when she first signed up for the
scholarship. The court concluded it wasn't.'
Delay in asserting conscientious objector status is a third factor
emphasized in § 6(j) cases. In United States v Messinger,' the Second
Circuit upheld a review board's denial of exemption status. Irwin
Messinger claimed conscientious objector status two years after
registering with the Selective Service System and only after various
attempts to be exempted as a student failed. The court held that delay
in asserting beliefs was evidence of insincerity.'" Courts are quick to
point out, however, that delay is not evidence of insincerity if the
161
registrants' beliefs have changed.
The fourth and fifth factors -religious leader testimony and
strength of statement-are relevant only in some cases. Review
boards often hear testimony from religious leaders." This factor is not
decisive because religious exemptions do not require believers to be
155 Id at 382.
156 See, for example, United States v Abbott, 425 F2d 910,913 (8th Cir 1970):
A local board may find that an applicant lacks sincerity in his beliefs because his demeanor
demonstrates a shiftiness or evasive attitude.... However, this cannot serve as a basis-in-
fact for an appeal board to reject a conscientious objector claim unless there exists some
disclosure of this finding of unreliability by the local board on the applicant's selective
service record.
157 See Hanna v Secretary of the Army, 513 F3d 4, 6 (1st Cir 2008). Mary Hanna's
conscientious objector status claim was analyzed under former 32 CFR § 75.5 (2007), but the
standard for determining conscientious objector status is the same.
158 See Hanna, 513 F3d at 12-14.
159 413 F2d 927 (2d Cir 1969).
160 Id at 932.
161 See Hanna, 513 F3d at 12-13.
162 See Lovallo v Resor, 443 F2d 1262,1263-64 (2d Cir 1971).
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members of particular religions.'" But courts look favorably on
religious leaders who are personally acquainted with a registrant. The
final factor is the strength of the registrant's statement. When
requesting a § 6(j) exemption, a registrant must agree to the
declaration: "[B]y reason of religious training and belief, [I am]
conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form.""" In
addition, a registrant must make a written statement that explains the
nature of her objections and the history of her beliefs. A thorough and
convincing statement can be evidence of sincerity."'
There is one major exception to the broad Witmer principle. The
government cannot prove insincerity by showing that an applicant's
conduct fails to conform to the teachings of a professed religion.'" The
government cannot prove that a Mormon's belief in the Bible is
insincere by demonstrating that she drinks alcohol. There are two
reasons for this. Courts are not comfortable deciding what a religion
requires and whether a person falls short of that required conduct.'
Also, courts often recognize that people may have sincere beliefs in
some principles, even though their behavior doesn't conform to all
teachings of a particular sect.
Despite generally agreeing on relevant factors, circuits disagree
about the level of evidence necessary to establish a prima facie case of
sincerity. Courts would need to resolve this disagreement if they apply
the § 6(j) test to religious prisoners. On the one hand, the Second
Circuit held that a registrant's signed statement of belief and
testimony before the review board are prima facie evidence of
sincerity.' The military draft board can overcome this presumption by
adducing evidence to refute the applicant's statement. The board
might attempt to prove, for example, that the applicant had never
expressed religious beliefs before applying for conscientious objector
status. The problem with this approach is that draft boards generally
163 See, for example, Seeger, 380 US at 185. See also Frazee v Illinois Department of
Employment Security, 489 US 829, 832-33 (1989).
164 50 USC App § 456(j).
165 See United States v Deere, 428 F2d 1119,1121 (2d Cir 1970).
166 See United States v Rutherford, 437 F2d 182,187 (8th Cir 1972):
Just as a registrant does not establish the sincerity of his claim merely by demonstrating
that he is a baptized member of an organized religion which dogmatically opposes
participation by its members in the military service, a registrant's decision not to conform
chapter and verse to the modes of his chosen religion is not per se indicative of insincerity.
167 See Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v Milivojevich, 426 US 696, 721-22 (1976)
("[R]eligious freedom encompasses the power (of religious bodies) to decide for themselves, free
from state interference, matters ... of faith and doctrine."). See also Africa, 662 F2d at 1032
("Judges are not oracles of theological verity, and the Founders did not intend for them to be
declarants of religious orthodoxy.").
168 See Lovallo, 443 F2d at 1264.
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do not have access to sufficient evidence to prove insincerity. On the
other hand, the Tenth Circuit held that an applicant's statement and
testimony is not prima facie evidence of sincerity. An applicant must
provide additional evidence.
4. Courts should adapt the conscientious objector
test to prisoners.
This Section argues that courts should adapt the well-developed
§ 6(j) sincerity test to prisoners in RFRA and RLUIPA cases. Courts
should adopt a rebuttable presumption in favor of sincerity if
prisoners claim to have sincere beliefs. I show that my approach would
have a minimal but important effect on prison administration.
a) Presumption of sincerity. The Supreme Court's Witmer
approach is a practical method for excluding disingenuous applicants
while accommodating sincere believers. As argued above, the text and
history of RFRA and RLUIPA require a similar test. Rather than
creating a new test from whole cloth, courts should rely on the
capacious sincerity test developed in Witmer. Trial-level courts should
act as the military review board, evaluating the truthfulness of a
prisoner's testimony and analyzing objective evidence. Appellate
courts should review a trial court's finding under the "no basis in fact"
standard.
If courts apply Witmer to RFRA and RLUIPA cases, they would
need to adapt the test to the idiosyncrasies of prison. In particular,
courts would need to resolve two issues: whether statements and
testimony are prima facie evidence of sincerity and which objective
factors identified in § 6(j) cases are relevant.
As noted above, the Second and Tenth Circuits disagree whether
statements of belief and testimony are prima facie evidence of
sincerity in § 6(j) cases.o Courts would need to resolve a similar issue
in RFRA and RLUIPA cases. Prisons generally require inmates to
make written statements before joining religious accommodation
programs, and inmates bringing claims generally testify about their
beliefs in court. Should inmates' statements and in-court testimony
create a rebuttable presumption of sincerity?
There are two reasons a presumption of sincerity is appropriate
in the prison context: one reason deals with incentives, the other with
ease of monitoring. Relative to military draftees, prisoners have a
weaker incentive to make false assertions of sincerity. Religious
accommodations often provide benefits solely to sincere adherents. It
169 See Salamy v United States, 379 F2d 838,842 (10th Cir 1967).
170 See notes 168-69 and accompanying text.
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is unlikely that anyone other than sincerely religious Muslims want to
participate in the Ramadan fast.
The Supreme Court recognized this point in Cutter v Wilkinson:"
"[W]e doubt that all accommodations would be perceived as
'benefits.' For example, congressional hearings on RLUIPA revealed
that one state corrections system served as its kosher diet 'a fruit, a
vegetable, a granola bar, and a liquid nutritional supplement-each
and every meal.'".. Kosher food must be prepared in special kitchens
that prisons often do not have access to, so inmates desiring kosher
meals often must eat frozen or dried meals."' Inmates may request
transfers to facilities that prepare hot kosher meals, but this option is
not always available or convenient. In Michigan, for example,
"institutions [that prepare hot kosher food] are only located in cold,
isolated parts of the state, making it practically impossible for family
members or clergy to regularly travel 800 miles or more to provide
any visitation."..
There are other reasons prisoners may refrain from making false
religious assertions. A congressional committee hearing revealed that
at least some Jewish prisoners "are afraid to even announce their
religion, for fear of the anti-Semitic attitude of wardens, guards and
other inmates.""'5 He further stated, "Non-Jews who inquire about
converting to Judaism are subjected to harassment and intimidation,
too."' A gang of Texas inmates killed a man who requested religious
accommodations.'7
Such behavior is clearly intolerable, but the point is important:
inmates have a weaker incentive than military draftees to feign
sincerity. In most cases, the downside of unwanted accommodations
and possible discrimination will outweigh any psychic benefit a
prisoner may receive from causing administrative headaches.
Congress implicitly recognized military draftees' strong incentives to
make false assertions by appointing the FBI to assist military review
boards in making sincerity determinations. '71 Still, prisoners
occasionally invent religions specifically to receive accommodations.
171 544 US 709 (2005).
172 Id at 721 n 10.
173 See Clair A. Cripe, Legal Aspects of Correction Management 182 (Jones & Bartlett 2003).
174 Protecting Religious Freedom after Boerne v. Flores (Part III), Hearing before the
Subcommittee on the Constitution of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 105th Cong,
2d Sess 78, 80 (1999) (statement of Isaac M. Jaroslawicz, Aleph Institute), online at http://
commdocshouse.gov/committees/judiciary/hju57227.000/hju57227_0f.htm (visited June 18,2011).
175 Id at 89.
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 See Seeger, 380 US at 185.
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For example, members of the Church of the New Song informed
prison officials that their religion required a regular diet of sherry and
steak." But courts are generally quick to recognize sham religions.
There is a second reason courts should adopt the Second Circuit's
presumption of sincerity in RFRA and RLUIPA cases. Prison officials
are in a much better position than military draft boards to refute false
assertions. Prisons monitor inmates' day-to-day activities. Prison guards
can observe whether allegedly devout Muslims pray, read the Koran,
and abstain from pork.
For instance, prison guards usually are present at religious services,
and officials electronically monitor inmates who attend. According to a
federal prison official, federal prisons have "increase[ed] supervision
within the federal system so that no inmate-led religious groups meet
without 100 percent staff supervision."so They also have "install[ed]
electronic monitoring devices in chapels [and] increase[d] training and
scrutiny of religious volunteers and contractors."' A majority of state
prisons similarly monitor religious services.18 Prisons have generally
increased efforts to monitor prisoners' religious practices since 9/11.'83
Prisons also monitor visitors; they know whether a supposedly
religious inmate has consulted with a religious leader. Alaskan prison
guidelines state that while "[p]risoners may privately consult with a
religious volunteer or faith representative in the visitation area or any
other appropriate location," correctional officers "may view the
meeting.""
Moreover, prison chaplains are responsible for providing religious
materials to inmates.' They know which prisoners have requested
Bibles or other religious items. Prison officials can refute false
assertions of sincerity by demonstrating that an allegedly devout inmate
179 Cripe, LegalAspects at 182 (cited in note 173).
180 US Commission on Civil Rights, Enforcing Religious Freedom in Prison *35 (2008), online
at http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/usccr/documents/cr12r274.pdf (visited Apr 26,2011).
181 Id.
182 See id at *34 n 96. See also Barbara Esposito and Lee Wood, Prison Slavery 157-58
(Joel 1982).
183 See US Commission on Civil Rights, Enforcing Religious Freedom in Prison at *37 (cited
in note 180) ("At the local level, the L.A. County Jails notes that since 9/11, it has maintained a close
relationship with the Joint Terrorism Task Force Radicalization Work Group.").
184 State of Alaska Department of Corrections, Policies and Procedures: Religious Services,
Religious Program *2 (Sept 1990), online at http://www.correct.state.ak.us/corrections/pnp/pdf
/816.01.pdf (visited Apr 26,2011) (stating that correctional officers may view religious interviews,
but they may not record the conversations).
185 See United States Commission on Civil Rights, Enforcing Religious Freedom in Prison
at *111 (cited in note 180) ("Ivo federal prisons acknowledged continuing or expanding their
checks on incoming religious materials, in particular those available in religious libraries"); James
A. Beckford and Sophie Gilliat, Religion in Prison: Equal Rites in a Multi-faith Society 184-87
(Cambridge 1998).
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doesn't attend religious services or use religious items. Prison officials
can more easily access relevant evidence than military review boards.
b) Rebutting the presumption. I have so far argued that courts
should apply the Witmer approach coupled with the Second Circuit's
presumption of sincerity. In a typical RFRA or RLUIPA case, a
backsliding prisoner would need to show that removal prevented her
from practicing her beliefs. The court would presume that her beliefs
are sincere based on the inmate's initial written statement to
participate in the program and in-court testimony.
In many cases, prison officials would not challenge the
presumption of sincerity. The court would then turn to the compelling-
interest inquiry. If prison officials challenge the presumption, however,
they would need to adduce relevant "objective facts." They would bear
the burden of proving that the prisoner's beliefs are insincere. At this
point, the prisoner also could provide additional evidence to
strengthen her case. Three facts identified in § 6(j) cases would be
particularly relevant to officials attempting to rebut the presumption:
inconsistent claims, no prior evidence of beliefs, and delay.
Inconsistent claims would be strong evidence of insincerity. Fact
finders should be skeptical of a prisoner's sincere desire to eat kosher
food if he eats kosher food one month, participates in Ramadan the
next, then switches back to kosher food. This prisoner would almost
certainly lose. Prior violations of accommodations would be weak
evidence of inconsistency, since even sincere believers are imperfectly
religious. As the Seventh Circuit noted, therefore, backsliding should
be considered evidence of insincerity, but not conclusive evidence."
Delay or a lack of previous expressions of belief would also be
strong evidence of insincerity. Fact finders should be skeptical of
accommodation requests if there is no pre-request evidence of beliefs.
Fact finders should similarly view delay in indicating beliefs as evidence
that a prisoner merely wants some accommodation and sees feigning
religion as a way to receive it. Fact finders should be especially skeptical
if an inmate doesn't express belief in Judaism or eating kosher food
until after kosher food is made available to other prisoners.
If prison officials decide to challenge the presumption of sincerity,
inmates also would introduce additional evidence. Inmates would try to
strengthen their case by showing prior instances of religious expression
and other relevant objective facts, thereby hoping to prove that their
beliefs in the accommodated practices are sincere. As in § 6(j) cases,
inmates could call religious leaders as witnesses. Religious leader
testimony would be especially helpful if the leader personally worked
186 See Reed, 842 F2d at 963.
[78:14311458
Religious Sincerity and Imperfection
with the inmate. But courts should not infer insincerity from a lack of
expert testimony. This inference would create the impermissible
requirement that a prisoner be a member of a particular religious
group. Inmates would also be able to rely on the strength of their
statements in proving sincerity.
In sum, prison officials bear the burden of proving insincerity if
they challenge the presumption of sincerity. This approach requires fact
finders to weigh competing evidence and make conclusions. Some
decisions will be easy: a devout Orthodox Jew unknowingly eats
nonkosher ice cream. Other cases will be less so: a Christian converts to
Judaism and eats nonkosher food on several occasions but otherwise
appears devout. Fact finders may occasionally face difficult inquiries,
but Congress mandated this analysis by adopting the First
Amendment's definition of religious exercise. As the Supreme Court
has stated in related First Amendment jurisprudence, "In each case, the
inquiry calls for line drawing; no fixed per se rule can be framed."'
Importantly, my approach significantly reduces the number of
difficult inquires by creating a rebuttable presumption -just as the
Second Circuit did in the conscription context. A presumption would
considerably decrease the number of cases in which courts must weigh
competing objective evidence.
c) Effect on prison management. How would prison officials
implement this approach? In general, prison officials would continue
managing religious accommodation programs as they have in the past.
Officials would still require inmates to make written statements
affirming religious beliefs before receiving accommodations. The
primary difference is how prison officials would respond to
backsliding prisoners.
My approach requires prison officials to focus on the sincerity of
the prisoners' beliefs. In response to backsliding, officials would perhaps
require prisoners to make additional statements reaffirming their
beliefs. If prisoners were unwilling, officials could safely conclude that
their beliefs are insincere. Prison officials may also require violating
prisoners to meet with the prison chaplain, who may be in a better
position to determine if a prisoner's beliefs are sincere. Or officials may
comprehensively evaluate past evidence-such as surveillance data and
written statements-to make a detailed sincerity determination. Some
prisons may simply allow backsliding prisoners to continue
participating, a result that may not be so bad.'
187 Lynch v Donnelly, 465 US 668,678 (1984).
188 See Africa, 662 F2d at 1037 ("[lIt is not clear from the record why special
accommodations cannot be made in this instance for a prisoner who obviously cares deeply
about what food he eats.").
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Prison officials who remove prisoners from accommodation
programs might fear that a court will disagree with their conclusions.
But such fears would be exaggerated. If the court finds a substantial
burden on religious exercise under RFRA or RLUIPA, prison
officials can still avoid liability by showing a compelling interest. For
example, the district court ultimately denied Lovelace's RLUIPA
claim on remand because it concluded that the policy of removing
one-time violators served a compelling interest, even though the
policy itself was a substantial burden."9 And even if prison officials
lose, most courts agree that prisoners are entitled only to injunctive
relief.'9 Prison officials would simply need to return the prisoner to
the accommodation program. This approach would therefore require
prison officials to make minor but meaningful changes.
B. Benefits of a Sincerity-Centered Approach
There are a number of advantages to the sincerity approach.
Foremost, my approach is faithful to the text and express purpose of
RFRA and RLUIPA. It advances RFRA's stated purpose of "restor[ing]
the compelling interest test as set forth in [Sherbert] and [Yoder]."1' Daly
and Lovelace pay lip service to this purpose-by adopting the pre-Smith
definition of substantial burden-but they surprisingly fail to consider
whether eliminating accommodations is a substantial burden under pre-
Smith jurisprudence. The current approaches seem to recognize that a
prisoner's beliefs must be sincere, but they fail to address the relationship
between backsliding and sincerity.
Moreover, my solution addresses the broader issues raised by the
split between the Seventh and Fourth Circuits. At least under the
Seventh Circuit's approach, it is unclear whether the same analysis
applies when, for example, an inmate misses a worship service but
wants to attend another.192 Under a sincerity-based approach, the
important question is not whether there is a burden but whether there
is a burden on religious exercise. This requires the inmate to have
sincere beliefs. Backsliding would be evidence of insincerity, but
prison officials would need to adduce additional evidence-such as
189 See Lovelace v Lee, 2007 WL 2461750, *15 (WD Va) (discussing the number of prisoners
that may attempt to participate in the Ramadan program if stringent rules were not applied to it).
190 See, for example, Colvin, 605 F3d at 289 ("[T]his court has recently held that monetary
damages are not available under RLUIPA."). There is a dispute whether damages are allowed
under RLUIPA. See generally Jennifer D. Larson, Comment, RLUIPA, Distress, and Damages,
74 U Chi L Rev 1443 (2007).
191 RFRA § 2(b)(1),42 USC § 2000bb(b)(1).
192 The Fourth Circuit addressed this issue, see Lovelace, 472 F3d at 188, but the other side
of the split has not.
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inconsistent religious expressions-to overcome the presumption. If
the court concluded that an inmate's beliefs are sincere, and thus that
there is a burden on religious exercise, the court would turn to the
question of substantial burden. Under this inquiry, the outcome would
be the same whether prison officials prevented an inmate from
attending a worship service after missing a service or after violating a
dietary accommodation. The burden would be substantial because the
inmate would be deprived of the opportunity to exercise deeply held
religious convictions.
My approach also overcomes the specific weaknesses of the two
current approaches. The Daly approach assumes that backsliding
prisoners are not pressured to violate their beliefs when officials
remove accommodations. Prisoners choose to violate in the first place.
Such an approach fails to recognize that religious laws are often
difficult to obey. Major religions recognize that people will fail to
achieve religious perfection. Paul wrote, "For all have sinned, and
come short of the glory of God.""3 As Judge Richard Posner pointed
out, "Some religions place unrealistic demands on their adherents;
others cater especially to the weak of will."..
Another problem with Daly is that it prevents erring adherents
from overcoming past mistakes. A Jew who eats nonkosher food loses
the opportunity to change. This makes repentance -a central teaching
of many religions' -impossible. Removing accommodations from
sinners may be as much of a burden on religious exercise as failing to
accommodate in the first place. For example, Daly was a practicing
Jew for over eight years.' Prison officials removed Daly from a
kosher food program after he ate nonkosher food three times. But the
food was confusingly labeled on one occasion,' and he denied eating
nonkosher food on the other two occasions.'1 My approach would
have required officials to evaluate the sincerity of Daly's beliefs,
rather than suspending him and forcing him to violate his stated
beliefs. Under a sincerity-based approach, the Seventh Circuit likely
193 Romans 3:23 (King James Version).
194 Reed, 842 F2d at 963.
195 See, for example, Psalms 51:10 (King James Version) ("Create in me a pure heart, 0
God, and renew a steadfast spirit within me."); Ezekial 33:10-20 ("As I live-declares the Lord
God-I do not desire the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way and live;
turn back, turn back from your evil ways, for why should you die, 0 House of Israel?"); Surah al-
Baqara 2:222 ("Surely Allah loves those who turn unto him in repentance and loves those who
purify themselves.").
196 See Daly v Davis, 2008 WL 879048, *1 (SD Ill).
197 Id.
198 Daly, 2009 WL 773880 at *2 (noting an issue of fact on whether the prison guards who
testified that they had seen Daly eat nonkosher food had testified truthfully).
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would have found prison officials liable; other than the three alleged
infractions, there was no evidence of insincerity in eight years.
A sincerity-based approach also addresses the concerns that
Judge Wilkinson expressed in his Lovelace dissent. Judge Wilkinson
worried that the majority ignored the realities of operating a prison.
Prison officials have an interest in removing nonbelievers from
accommodation programs, since many religious accommodations
require extra resources. Prison officials must increase the number of
nighttime guards and cooks to facilitate the Ramadan fast. Also, the
Lovelace majority's deferential approach makes it more difficult to
discipline deceitful and unruly prisoners.
As Professor William Marshall noted, "The sincerity test has been
used most often in cases in which the free exercise clause could easily
have been abused by fraudulent claims."200 There is a risk that insincere
prisoners will attempt to receive accommodations, although the risk is
lower here than in the military draft context. My approach recognizes
prison officials' managerial interest in removing false claimants-and
thus responds to Judge Wilkinson's challenge-by allowing officials to
screen out false claimants. And it does so while remaining faithful to
the text and stated purpose of RFRA and RLUIPA.
C. Applying the Presumption-of-Sincerity Approach
I now return to the story of Saul and Ananias from the
Introduction. Both Saul and Ananias joined a Protestant
denomination while in a state prison. Saul ate meat once during an
annual fast. He regretted his transgression and consulted with his
religious leader. Ananias attended one religious service after joining,
but he didn't otherwise change his behavior. He didn't observe the
fast. Both Saul and Ananias were removed from the fasting program
and could not attend worship services for one month. Do either of
them have claims under RLUIPA?
Under the Daly approach, neither has a valid claim. Both Saul
and Ananias removed themselves from the religious accommodation
programs by violating the fast. Their failure to observe the fast means
removal is not a substantial burden. Under the Lovelace approach,
both prisoners likely have RLUIPA claims. The fasting program
imposes a substantial burden because, though both prisoners indicated
a desire to participate, they were removed for one-time violations. In
199 Lovelace, 472 F3d at 204 (Wilkinson concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The only
certainty that the majority guarantees is litigation over matters large and small, with federal courts
thrust into a role they have sought assiduously to avoid-that of micromanaging state prisons.").
200 Marshall, 67 Minn L Rev at 554 n 58 (cited in note 138).
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effect, their claims that they are religious would be conclusive
evidence that the policy imposes a substantial burden. The ultimate
success of their RLUIPA claims would depend on whether the court
found that the government had a compelling interest.
My solution would produce a more sensible outcome. Instead of
jumping to the substantial-burden inquiry, the court would first ask
whether the removal policy burdens the prisoners' religious exercise.
The critical inquiry would be whether Saul's and Ananias's beliefs are
sincere. Under the modified Witmer approach, the court would find
that Saul's and Ananias's preparticipation statements and in-court
testimony are prima facie evidence of sincerity. Prison officials could
then attempt to rebut the presumption of sincerity by proving any
relevant objective facts that cast the prisoners' claims into doubt-
except nonconformance to a specific religion's teachings.
It is likely the fact finder would conclude that Ananias's beliefs
are insincere. Prisons officials would overcome the presumption of
sincerity by demonstrating that, other than recently joining the
denomination, Ananias had not expressed religious convictions. Prison
officials would know that Ananias didn't own a Bible and that he had
not attended worship services regularly- enabling the fact finder to
conclude that Ananias's beliefs in attending worship services are
insincere. Ananias's statement of belief wasn't convincing, and he
probably would not be able to call a familiar religious leader as a
witness to confirm his belief in fasting.
On the other hand, it is likely the fact finder would conclude that
Saul's beliefs are sincere. He read the Bible daily and regularly
attended worship services. Also, he was nearly perfect in his observance
of the fast. He expressed remorse to a religious leader when he failed to
keep the fast. Prison officials would likely point to his recent conversion
and his one-time decision to eat prime rib as evidence of insincerity, but
it is unlikely the fact finder would decide that this is sufficient evidence
to overturn the presumption of sincerity.
After concluding that removal was a burden on Saul's religious
exercise, the court would ask whether the burden is substantial. Pre-
Smith case law indicates that the burden is substantial because
removal prevented Ananias from engaging in religiously motivated
conduct. The burden would then shift entirely to the prison officials to
show that removal served a "compelling governmental interest; and
[was] the least restrictive means of furthering that ... interest."20 1
201 RFRA § 2,42 USC § 2000cc-1(a)(1)-(2).
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CONCLUSION
Prisoners forfeit many freedoms, but they "do not lose their right
to practice their religion when the prison gate closes behind them.,,"
Do they lose the right to practice their religion when they violate
religious accommodations? Courts have answered this question two
different ways, both sides debating whether removing accommodations
from backsliding prisoners is a substantial burden.
In rushing to determine whether the burden is substantial, both
approaches have missed the critical prior question: Is there even a
burden on religious exercise? Answering this question requires courts
to know whether prisoners hold sincere beliefs. Once the court knows
that a backsliding prisoner's beliefs are sincere, it becomes clear that
removal is a substantial burden.
One possible explanation for this misguided focus on burden is
that no standardized sincerity test has emerged in RFRA and
RLUIPA cases. Courts may therefore be more comfortable trying to
fit the accommodation question into the burden framework, but the fit
is awkward. I attempt to remedy this problem by adapting the
conscientious objector sincerity test to the prison context. My
proposal leads to a sensible outcome that allows sincere prisoners to
practice their religion but does not force prison officials to
accommodate disingenuous prisoners.
202 Moskowitz v Wilkinson, 432 F Supp 947, 948 (D Conn 1977), citing Cruz v Beto,
405 US 319, 322 (1972) ("[R]easonable opportunities must be afforded to all prisoners to
exercise the religious freedom guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments without fear
of penalty.").
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